This article looks at one of the more obscure moments in British constitutional history, the rise of federal devolution in the United Kingdom in the early 20th century and, in particular, the context to the Conference on Devolution that sat between October 1919 and April 1920.
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In the decades since the conference's proceedings concluded in stalemate, the Conference on Devolution has been consigned to the margins of political and constitutional history. Indeed, one could almost be forgiven for not knowing that the conference ever happened, let alone what its conclusions were. Not only has the conference attracted minimal attention within studies of devolution in the United Kingdom, 7 it has received a similar reception within the cottage industry of British federal studies. 8 Even in the volume described by Michael Burgess as a 'masterly account' 9 of the conference, Devolution in Great Britain, 10 only one out of the book's nine chapters is exclusively focused on the Conference on Devolution. 
The Road to the Conference on Devolution: The Limits of an Irish-Centric Historiography
However, while the Conference on Devolution has been somewhat neglected by the literature, the broader subject of federal devolution and territorial governance in the United Kingdom in the early 20th century has been dominated by the Irish question. There has been a tendency among certain historians to see the conference, and the flirtation of certain actors at the centre with devolution in this era, almost exclusively through the prism of the crisis in Ireland, a conceptualisation that, as this article will contend, misses the importance of the other dynamics that motivated reformers and sparked these debates. Crucially in doing so, it
also results in what appears to be a distorted perception of the conference, one in which it resembles a straightforwardly monochrome, and arguably predestined, failure.
At the heart of this Irish-centric historiography are Alvin Jackson, John Kendle and George Boyce. Jackson, for example, dismissed the Conference on Devolution as part of a 'lingering diminuendo' of the 'federalist assault' on British politics that had been catalysed by the crisis in Ireland. 12 Jackson appears to view the failure of federalism, and by association the Conference on Devolution, through the prism of Ireland and clearly links the collapse of federal devolution debates to the inability of the British state to provide a federal 4 settlement agreeable to Irish nationalist opinion. 13 Ireland, as he acknowledges, was simply too far gone and among members of the British government, the urgency required to initiate reform was, as a result, considerably diminished. 14 Kendle adopts a similar perspective, and while he acknowledges the role of other factors in the rise in saliency of devolution in the early 20th century, he is resolute that regardless of the role played by concerns of parliamentary congestion, it was ultimately
Ireland that served to foil both the conference 15 and the prospects of devolution more broadly: 16 Most of the Unionists became involved because they wanted to find some means of keeping Ireland within the United Kingdom. If it had not been for the threat of an independent Ireland which they [unionists] believed implicit in home rule, they would have happily settled for reforms to Parliamentary procedure in order to resolve congestion. 17 Reflecting on devolution's rise in saliency during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Boyce similarly concluded that without the Irish question, 'it is safe to say that federalism would hardly have merited serious political discussion in the British Isles; or at least would not have moved beyond discussion and into the policy process'. 18 However, while Ireland was undoubtedly a crucial aspect of the devolution debates in this period, the Irish-centric approach of Jackson, Kendle and Boyce risks undermining the role played by other dynamics, in particular the role played by parliamentary congestion.
As this article will demonstrate, this is a significant weakness in the Irish-centric historiography on devolution in the early 20th century, not least because parliamentary congestion was at the heart of the Conference on Devolution's raison d'être, as Speaker Lowther himself made clear in his memoirs. 19 5 While Ireland has been depicted as a dominant actor in the centre's flirtation with constitutional reform in this period, it was not the only catalyst that spurred intellectuals and policy makers to contemplate the efficacy of schemes of either pan-Empire, or UK-wide federal devolution. Another significant motivator was the concern that Westminster was too overburdened and congested to operate effectively as both an imperial and domestic legislature. 20 Concerns about parliamentary congestion were aired by a number of politicians and political commentators during the 19th century, including Walter Bagehot (who described the problems associated with parliamentary congestion as 'the greatest defect of the House of Commons').
Congestion as a Catalyst: Parliamentary Overload and Federal Devolution

21
These concerns about the ever-increasing congestion of business in parliament continued through the late 19th century and into the early 20th, 22 and seemed to be a point on which politicians from across the Victorian and Edwardian British party system could agree.
Even Sir Gilbert Campion, who, as will be discussed later, played a crucial role in formulating a conservative and intra-parliamentary scheme of devolution during the Conference on Devolution, conceded that 'the steadily increasing pressure of legislative business in the House of Commons during the last [century] has made the problem of devolution one of first class importance'. 23 A subject of greater debate, however, was the question of how this congestion could be resolved.
One of the more immediate attempts to resolve parliamentary congestion was the creation of new standing committees within the House of Commons. 24 By 1914, six new standing committees had been established by the Commons' authorities as a means of rebalancing the parliamentary workload. 25 This rise of the committee system, however, was not without its critics. Indeed, a particularly prominent aspect of this opposition was the claim that these procedural innovations demeaned the integrity of the House of Commons as an institution, not least because these committees required serving MPs to absent themselves 6 from the floor of the chamber while the House was in session. 26 Further criticism of an extension of the committee system came on the grounds that the existing committee system was not only ignored by the government, but often by the MPs who were supposed to attend them.
27
If intra-parliamentary reform was one way in which the British political elite wrestled with reducing the workload of parliament, another mooted change was the devolution of power to subordinate legislatures. One such advocate was the Conservative intellectual, Sidney Low.
28
Low's support for devolution was not based on any strongly-felt desire to see national sentiment recognized more clearly in the institutional apparatus of the British state, rather he believed that:
some machinery of subordinate legislatures and executives, some devolution on a large and systematic scale would be required in order to relieve the central Parliament of burdens beyond its strength.
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As will be a recurrent theme in this section, Low's advocacy of devolution was not based on a desire radically to restructure the British state; rather it was based on a desire to preserve and enhance parliamentary government in the United Kingdom. Indeed, he sought subordinate bodies that operated 'under the reserved sovereignty of a central legislature'. 30 Relief of parliament was, therefore, cast as a means of defending parliament at a time when it and other institutions of the British state were 'overloaded, indeed overwhelmed' with the multitude of domestic and imperial tasks within its jurisdiction. 31 This instrumental conceptualisation of devolution would become particularly prevalent among English politicians in the years preceding the Conference on Devolution. 32 Unlike the influence of national sentiment in the support for federal devolution among a number of political actors in Scotland and Wales, English political elites, were 'almost exclusively concerned with the question of good government'. Furthermore, these were worries that formed a central part of devolutionist lobbying campaigns within the cabinet, as can be seen from a memorandum drafted by Austen
Chamberlain for the cabinet in June 1918. 44 For Chamberlain, parliament was simply unable to cope with the scale of social and industrial problems that would emerge from the war, issues he described as being of the 'first magnitude'. 45 These were issues that threatened to overwhelm both parliament and executive, particularly when one considers the additional imperial duties parliament had been encumbered with and the worsening crisis in Ireland. 46 As he noted: 'How is it possible for one Government and one Parliament to deal adequately with all these matters and at the same time perform the functions as the great central organs of Government of the Empire?' 47 Facing such challenges, the power, prestige and stability of the UK state was clearly considered by Chamberlain to be in considerable danger. When parliamentary institutions break down, whether from lack of authority or from overwork, Bolshevism has its opportunity. Unless means can be found to devolve a part of its responsibilities on other bodies, and to set the Imperial Parliament free for the work which it alone can do, I think we shall be in grave danger of revolution before many years are passed. 49 Under pressure from both communities in Ireland, Government and Parliament were both, Chamberlain feared, at risk of collapse under the increasing weight of their domestic and imperial workloads. 50 On a number of fronts it seemed that the centre 51 was in crisis and while Ireland provided a strong stimulus for action, so, too, did parliamentary congestion, as
Chamberlain highlights in the conclusion to his memorandum,
The conclusions to which I invite the assent of the Cabinet are therefore - 56 In the House of Lords and, more importantly, the House of Commons, the spring and summer of 1919 would see two debates that highlighted the centrality of parliamentary congestion to the case for federal devolution.
The first of these debates took place in the Lords on 5 March 1919, on the following resolution:
That for the purpose of (a) securing prompt and efficient handling of pressing domestic problems and better control over public expenditure, and (b) enabling the Imperial Parliament to devote more attention to the general interests of the United Kingdom and matters of common Imperial concern than is possible under the present system of a single Parliament and Cabinet, the establishment of local legislatures throughout the United Kingdom is an urgent necessity. 57 It is scarcely surprising, in view of the correspondence mentioned earlier, that Lord Brassey's speech, in moving this resolution, was dominated by the subject of parliamentary congestion.
While acknowledging that parliamentary overload was 'a very old theme' in British politics, he argued that the current situation was not only 'ten times more serious than it ever was before', but, in terms somewhat akin to Chamberlain, that 'under present conditions it is impossible for Parliament to discharge its functions as a Parliament, that democratic principles cannot be maintained, and that the people through their representatives cannot control administration, legislation, or public expenditure'.
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For Brassey, as with Chamberlain, reform was less an ideological crusade than a practical response to a high-political crisis, in which parliamentary congestion appeared to threaten the very fabric of parliamentary government in the United Kingdom. 59 Indeed, Brassey declared that he would not 'for one moment advocate this policy of Devolution unless I sincerely and thoroughly believed that it would lead to the better control of the administration and better control of public expenditure'. 60 Simply put, devolution was a 11 necessary reform if parliament were to retain its political influence and authority and, crucially, for her sovereignty to be retained. 61 Lord Selborne, while discussing devolution as a 'necessary and an almost essential step towards the realization of' a more integrated Empire, 62 similarly dedicated the substantive part of his speech to the sense that, as a result of parliamentary congestion, parliament was an institution in crisis. Echoing the alarm expressed by Brassey, Selborne's defence of devolution was based on a belief that congestion had rendered parliament a eunuch in matters of high politics and as an institution at the heart of the empire:
I submit to you that Parliament is impotent to deal properly either with the domestic problems which confront us here in the United Kingdom, or with the problems of the Empire which, until a true Imperial Parliament exists, must be dealt with by the present Imperial Parliament. 63 Not only was parliament enfeebled as a result of congestion, but so too, in Selborne's opinion, was the system of cabinet government. 64 His message was clear: unless reform was undertaken, the consequences could be disastrous for the entire paraphernalia of parliamentary government in Britain. 65 In what was an otherwise poorly-attended debate (a point emphasized with what seems to have been particular relish by the lord chancellor in his response to Brassey's motion), 66 Selborne and Brassey's concerns about parliamentary congestion were echoed by a number of peers, including Lords Crewe, Charnwood and Bryce 67 (although Bryce, apparently in the belief that the resolution proposed federalism, voiced his concern at the imbalance that would be caused in the event of England having its own legislature). 68 Nevertheless, in the face of fierce opposition from the Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead,
Brassey was left with little option but to withdraw his resolution. 69 Greater success would be Ireland, defined in its general outlines by existing differences in law and administration between the three countries;
2. upon the extent to which these differences are applicable to Welsh conditions and requirements; and 3. upon the financial aspects and requirements of the measure. 70 While not invoking the perils of Bolshevism outlined by Chamberlain to his cabinet colleagues, Wood shared a similar assessment of the urgency of reform and the dangers of continued inaction in the face of creaking and overburdened parliamentary machinery. 71 In particular, Wood's speech was a reminder of the linkages between parliamentary congestion and concerns about Britain's role within the Empire, particularly in the aftermath of the war. 72 Indeed, Wood warned his fellow MPs of the mounting pressure on parliament's resources from developments in the dominions and colonies and drew attention to the relationship between parliamentary congestion and the Empire. Warning that the Commons would soon be faced with key questions of domestic and imperial concern, 'questions of defence, questions of trade, of naturalisation, of land settlement', 73 Wood claimed that unless
MPs seized the day and reduced the congestion of business, parliament risked the ignominy 13 of isolation as her dominions 'proceed on the business without us, and the work is conducted independently of us'. 74 In a similar vein, Murray Macdonald, a long-standing supporter of federal devolution, argued that devolution was a necessary response to the growing social, industrial and imperial demands that had added for 'nearly one hundred years, with constantly accumulating power and effect, to the mass and the volume of business of Parliament'. 75 Indeed, to underline further the role of federal devolution as a reform aimed at enhancing parliament's influence and institutional capacity, Macdonald stressed that parliamentary sovereignty would be in no way diminished, insisting, instead, that 'the change which the motion proposes would not have this effect at all'. 76 Given his conversion to the federal devolution cause, it was unsurprising that Walter
Long spoke in favour of the principle of reform. However, this support was qualified by opposition to aspects of the motion's wording, in particular the references to national devolution. 77 Federal devolution, he asserted, was essential in order to revive the key institutions of the central state and ensuring her continued leadership of the Empire. 78 No MP, Long claimed, had yet denied that the status quo was no longer working sufficiently for the United Kingdom and while claiming that his conversion to reform had been reluctant, borne out of necessity, he stressed the urgency of reforming a form of parliamentary government that was no longer fit for the demands of domestic and imperial governance in the 20th century. 79 The case for federal devolution, as elaborated by Wood, Macdonald and Long, was, therefore, not for a transformative change to the British constitution; rather it was for reform that would conserve the centre's significance. The argument in the eyes of these advocates was straightforward: for parliament to ensure its continued status as a powerful and prestigious institution at the heart of the Empire, it must accept the realities of political life (i.e., parliamentary congestion) and the need for reform. 80 This was a sentiment that would go on to command a dominant role during the two-day debate on the subordinate legislatures resolution, and while the debate could not completely divorce itself from Ireland, and though figures such as Henry Craik (a Scottish Unionist MP representing the combined Scottish universities constituency) voiced their dissent, 81 there can be little doubt as to the preeminence of parliamentary congestion in the debate. At the end of this two-day debate, the
Commons voted, by a majority of 187 to 34, in favour of Wood's resolution. 82 The stage was now set for the Conference on Devolution.
The Conference on Devolution, 1919-20
Following the successful subordinate legislatures resolution in the Commons on 4 June 1919, the coalition government, in response to a written question from Murray Macdonald, affirmed its intention to establish a commission on federal devolution. 83 Later that summer, the government, again in response to a written question, announced, on 4 August, that the Speaker of the Commons, James Lowther, had consented to chair the inquiry. 84 In October, the government announced the membership of the Conference on Devolution and its terms of reference. 85 Comprising 33 members, 16 from each house of parliament and with Lowther in the chair, the conference was given the following remit:
To consider and report upon a scheme of Legislative and Administrative Devolution within the United Kingdom having regard to -
1) The need of reserving to the Imperial parliament the exclusive consideration ofa) Foreign and Imperial Affairs; and b) Subjects affecting the United Kingdom as a whole.
2) The allocation of financial powers as between the Imperial Parliament and the subordinate legislatures, special consideration being given to the need of providing for the effective administration of the allocated powers. 3) The special needs and characteristics of the component portions of the United Kingdom in which subordinate legislatures are set up. 86 Following the announcement of the membership and terms of reference, the Conference on Devolution met on 23 October 1919. In the first of its 32 sittings, the members outlined the procedure of future meetings, with sessions scheduled for 11 am to 1 pm on Tuesdays and Thursdays. 87 As the Speaker's letter to the prime minister highlighted, the first topic which 'engaged the attention of the Conference was the question as to what ought to be the units of area to which a scheme of devolution should apply'; 88 in essence, whether devolution should proceed along national and/or regional lines.
The Units of Devolution: National or Regional Devolution for the United Kingdom
According to both Lowther and Gorell, it did not take much time for the conference to agree that Scotland and Wales should be represented via national legislatures. 89 Indeed, according to Gorell, by only the third session, members were 'more or less agreed as to Scotland and Wales each having their own Parliaments'.
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England's representation, however, proved to be a far more contentious issue.
This was apparent from the very outset of the conference's discussions on the areas to be represented by devolution. As Lord Gladstone's notes from the second sitting on 28 October detail, this session saw Brassey and Macdonald make the case for the principle that the 'units of area should be based on nationality' for England, Scotland and Wales, only to be faced by opposition from Ulster Unionist members of the conference. 91 Ronald McNeill argued instead, that no legislative unit 'should be larger than others in combination' 92 and, according to Gorell, 'spoke for an hour', insisting that such legislatures should be based around the principle of economic resource equality. 93 Neither of these arguments was particularly subtle. The first was a clear attempt to prevent the establishment of a national legislature for England (an attempt repeated by 16 McNeill and his colleagues in the following sitting on 30 October), while the second was a similarly transparent bid for a model of pan-UK regional devolution that would make provincial government for Ulster the norm, rather than an exception. As Gorell commented in his diary: 'his [McNeill's] real motive was to smooth the way for Ulster'.
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However, the problems facing the conference with regard to England were not simply a by-product of Ulster Unionist machinations. As it constituted the overwhelming proportion of the United Kingdom's population, even before the partition of Ireland, the question of how
England would assimilate into a system of federal devolution had been a vexatious one for advocates of reform long before the conference began its work. 97 Nor should it be surprising that these difficulties continued to dog the conference in the sessions that followed. The question of England monopolised the sittings on 28 October, 4 and 6 November. To quote Lowther's letter to the prime minister, 'considerable doubt arose' during these sessions on the question of how England should be resolved. 98 As a result, the conference was left with little choice at its fifth meeting on 6
November, but to postpone discussions on the subject in favour of 'an examination of the powers which might appear suitable to be devolved'. 99 
Dividing the Estate: The Conference's Deliberations on the Powers of the Devolved Legislatures
These deliberations on the powers that might be devolved to the legislatures (whomever they might represent or however they might be composed) are generally considered to be the success story of the Conference on Devolution. John Kendle, for example, has described the conference's agreement of a schedule of powers as an 'impressive achievement' that represented an 'interlude of agreement' in the conference's otherwise fraught proceedings.
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Indeed, this was an image that the Speaker himself was keen to convey. Not only did he describe the conference in his report as having been 'substantially agreed upon' the subject of powers, 101 but in private he was similarly, if not even more, effusive. In a private and confidential letter to Andrew Bonar Law on 18 December, he went as far as to claim that on this topic there had been 'practical unanimity' among the conference's membership.
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Media reports of the conference echoed Lowther's claim of consensus. Commenting on the publication of the report, The Times noted that the members of the conference were 'at one as to the various powers to be devolved on each legislature, to be exclusively reserved to the UK parliament, and to be exercised partly by one body and partly by the other'. 103 In its summary of the conference report, the Daily Mirror similarly reported that 'the areas which local legislatures should administer -viz., England, Scotland and Wales (including Monmouthshire) -are one of the points on which the conference was agreed'.
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This image of harmony was repeated years after the conference finished its work. In his memoirs, published in 1925, Lowther reiterated his claim that on the question of 'administrative powers', the conference achieved 'far greater unanimity [than on composition and areas to be administered] and in five sittings we have completed satisfactorily lists of topics which might fairly be administered by subordinate bodies'. 105 On paper at least, there appears good reason for Lowther to have depicted the conference's deliberations in this area as relatively harmonious. 106 Certainly, the report highlighted the 'practical unanimity' on the subject of powers, with both the rival Lowther and Macdonald devolution schemes (as will be elaborated later in this article) endorsing the allocation of powers laid out in an appendix. 107 Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence which does call into question Lowther's claim to consensus on the subject of powers, evidence from one of his closest colleagues.
While both Lowther and Macdonald believed in the importance of parliamentary sovereignty, they differed considerably in their vision of how this should coexist with a scheme of devolution. Indeed, it is worth noting that Lowther's memoirs referred to agreement on the devolution of administrative rather than legislative powers. 108 While this might have been a straightforward failure of memory (Lowther's memoirs were written five years after the publication of the report), it is, arguably, symptomatic of his minimalist approach to devolution, an attitude evident throughout the briefing papers and memoranda prepared for him by the conference's secretary, an assistant clerk in the House of Commons, Sir Gilbert Campion.
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A dominant theme throughout Campion's papers was a sense of discomfort and, indeed, opposition to the idea that national and local issues could be easily separated. They repeatedly warned of the difficulty of dividing central and local issues, asserting that 'the interconnection is so close that it might easily arise that the two kinds of parliament and Nevertheless, while these memoranda may not have contradicted Lowther's commitment to the schedule of powers, they provide a notable challenge to the apparent orthodoxy that at least on the question of the powers to be devolved, the conference achieved consensus.
Ultimately, they reveal that while a consensus on powers may have existed on paper, it certainly did not exist in practice. 
A Return to the Units of Devolution: The English Question Answered?
While these tensions bubbled under the surface, the conference, apparently in agreement on the subject of powers, returned to the question of England's role in a devolved United Kingdom. According to Lowther's letter to the prime minister, the conference's deliberations on powers had served to clarify matters in favour of national devolution for England, with regionalisation considered to 'present such formidable administrative difficulties that … ought not to form a feature of such a system in its initial stage'. 114 As with the question of powers, there, again, appears to be good reason to believe that the conference managed to come to a swift resolution following the resumption of their deliberations on the English question in December 1919. Indeed, by this time both the pro-devolutionist and more conservative wings of the conference membership appear to have been working on the assumption that England would be retained as a singular unit.
Not only did Viscount Gladstone present a working paper for his devolutionist colleagues on 11 December entitled 'On the Assumption that England is undivided', 115 but around the same time the embryonic stages of the Speaker's intra-parliamentary devolution proposals were presented to the conference. 116 The precise details of the Speaker's proposals 20 will be discussed shortly, but crucially for this discussion, they envisaged a singular form of representation for England. 117 This state of affairs had been confirmed by Lowther in his letter to Bonar Law on 18 September 1919, in which he described the conference as having moved to a discussion of two differing proposals for devolution, both of which retained
England as a single unit. 118 However, although this suggests that the issue of England's representation had been Campion's papers, prepared for the Speaker, again demonstrate this difference of opinion and the way in which England became another means with which to critique Macdonald's devolution proposals; indeed, they warned that England's predominance within the United Kingdom would result in friction between an English legislature and the central parliament that would leave the latter a diminished body. 121 Again, this is not a contradictory position, rather a reflection of the differing nature of the intra-parliamentary devolution envisaged by the Speaker and the scheme proposed by Murray Macdonald. It is to the conference's deliberations on these proposals that this article will now turn. 
Keeping it in the Family? The Composition of Devolution and the Relationship between Subordinate Legislatures and Whitehall
Two differing schemes of devolution were put before the conference; schemes that, while offering the same powers and fiscal responsibilities and national representation for England, Scotland and Wales, diverged on the question of how these bodies should be constituted. The inability of the conference to bridge this difference would prove fatal.
The first scheme, belonging to Speaker Lowther, was brought to the attention of the conference in December 1919. His proposal was for a measure of intra-parliamentary (at least initially) devolution inspired by the grand committee system within the House of Commons:
We have in the Scottish Standing Committee, of which the House of Commons has had considerable experience, the germ of a system which could be extended and strengthened. The Scottish Standing Committee, enshrined in our Standing Orders for the last thirty years, is the first step towards devolution and sets out the direction which we might well follow. 122 However, while inspired by the grand committee system, Lowther's proposals differed in the sense that these bodies -he titled them 'Grand Councils' -would be bicameral. The lower chamber, or 'The Council of Commons', would consist, for England, Scotland and Wales, of the MPs elected from constituencies in those respective nations, while the upper chamber, 'The Council of Peers', would be composed of a number of peers equal to half the number of MPs returned from each nation, chosen by the committee of selection of the house of lords. 123 Sessions of these Grand Councils would take place during the autumn months, while spring and summer would be reserved for 'the ordinary session' of parliament. 124 Among the strengths Lowther claimed for his scheme were the following: While aware that his scheme would not delight all members of the conference,
Lowther warned (as it turned out prophetically) of the fate that would await a divided conference: 'if the labours of our Conference should end in a sharp division of opinion, or in several reports being presented, our labours will probably have been in vain'. 128 His plan, because of its transitional nature, was thus cast as offering sufficient flexibility that conference members of all persuasions, from devolutionist to devo-sceptic, could find some point upon which they could agree. For sceptics it could be abandoned after one term, and for devolutionists it offered a means of achieving directly-elected legislatures.
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Despite this 'best of both worlds' appeal, Lowther's plan was greeted with opposition and even incredulity from devolutionists. Lord Gorell, for example, was scathing in his assessment of the proposals, describing them as 'a perfectly drivelling suggestion quite at variance with the elementary principle of real devolution'. 130 sought to keep the issue alive, the conference report and the issue of federal devolution slipped swiftly into the footnote status which it has enjoyed to the current day.
Conclusion
This article has explored one of the more obscure moments in the United Kingdom amid the otherwise fraught proceedings of the conference. As this article has demonstrated, while consensus on paper may have existed, it certainly did not in practice. The Conference on Devolution may be considered little more than a footnote in history today, but there is much more to learn about this rare moment in British constitutional history when territorial governance was approached in the round, particularly at a time when a UK constitutional convention has been brought onto the political agenda.
